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The institutional structure of the second pillar: CFSP and ESDP
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Beginnings:
the EPC |
With regard to the development of the EU's second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), we already established as part of Basic Course 2 that as the process of integration advances so too does the necessity to improve coordination of foreign policy issues. The first agreement in this area was reached in 1970. The following institutional framework was determined for the so-called European Political Cooperation (EPC).
As far as our objectives are concerned, the most decisive point is that this institution operated entirely at an intergovernmental level between the EC's member states and was clearly separated from the EC. This was done because a number of member states, especially Denmark and the UK with their strong intergovernmental stance towards the EC, had expressed explicitly their desire for it to be organized in this way. In the same way as international cooperation had been organized traditionally, the decision-making system was based on unanimity; as far as issues were concerned, it way based on a loose exchange of information and on coordinating the relative positions when necessary.
Other important milestones included Single European Act, which combined the EC with European Political Cooperation (EPC), and the Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) which established the CFSP as the second pillar of the EU structure. We now want to take a look at the institutional construction of the second pillar. [Back to top of page]
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CFSP in the Treaty of Maastricht |
The following illustration shows a significant development in the EPC, 20 years after its introduction.
Belonging to this first of all was the
close interlacing with the EC, which can perhaps be seen most clearly through the involvement of the Commission, and also from the fact that the Political Committee (part of the intergovernmental EPC cooperation) no longer passed its proposals to the Foreign Ministers Council directly but rather through the Committee of Permanent Representatives - an institutional part of the EC pillar. In addition to this, the Community's range of tools (on the right-hand side of the illustration) was expanded considerably; yet unanimity was still required for its use. [Back to top of page]
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Determinants of the institutional construction in CFSP |
And this brings to the question that has been accompanying us throughout this Main Subject Group, namely the question as to the core determining factors of the integration process, in this relation to the question as to the determining factors of the foreign policy cooperation. Indeed, the first half of the 1990s was still strongly influenced by the huge factors which had been responsible for shaping and influencing foreign policy cooperation from the very beginning and therefore also for shaping the structure of foreign policy cooperation and foreign policy focus, namely the different stances taken by states towards national sovereignty.
Yet for all this, they were not able to prevent other determinants from having an impact such as the changing international environment and the new unavoidable challenges connected to this or the decades of practical foreign policy cooperation.
The situation in the individual member states, their basic stance towards the EU and the question of national sovereignty and the nine or rather 12 existing differences in this regard led to a situation in which it was only possible to make changes in small steps. These issues have contributed to often contradictory rules and to problems during implementation, meaning that they were often in need of revision.
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CFSP in the Treaty of Amsterdam |
This can also be seen in the regulations on the CFSP in the Treaty of Amsterdam which came into force on the 1st of May 1999. It will introduce a "High Representative for
CFSP" (Javier Solana), who will at last give European foreign policy a face as well as allocating it with a strategic planning and early-warning unit, which is tasked with recognizing
CFSP-relevant international developments at an early stage. These changes are aimed at altering the very reactive character of European foreign policy.
Decisions will also be made easier because abstention from voting will no longer prevent resolutions. A transition to majority voting, however, which was actually desperately needed could not be agreed upon for the reasons we have already touched upon. Yet for all this and after decades in which this issue was taboo in the foreign policy cooperation between the member states, it is noteworthy that at long last security and defence policy issues did begin to play a role, regardless of how hesitantly this had been achieved. [Back to top of page]
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Development of the ESDP |
The breathtaking speed at which this area developed between 1998 and 2001 into a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) providing
CFSP with a military wing is quite incredible. Indeed, this was largely achieved outside of the large Treaty revisions of Amsterdam and Nice. To address these developments in depth would be to go far beyond the scope of this Basic Course. And anyway as far as our objectives are concerned, this is not necessary given that we are looking at the institutional structure of the 2nd pillar and its background.
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CFSP and ESDP following the Treaty of Nice |
The institutional structure following the Treaty of Nice was as follows:
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The PSC |
The Political and Security Committee (PSC) was born out of the EPC's Political Committee in the Treaty of Nice (article 25) . It is responsible for dealing with
all CFSP aspects, while at the same serving as the engine behind
CFSP and ESDP. The PSC is responsible for monitoring international events that are relevant for
CFSP/ESDP (analysis function) and providing the General Affairs and External Relations Council (Foreign Ministers Council) with recommendations for how policy should be structured (decision preparation) based on this analysis. The PSC is also charged with monitoring implementation of the policies agreed (implementation supervision) and forms an interface over which information exchange between the different institutions involved in the
CFSP/ESDP - including NATO (security function). This means, then, that the importance of this institution was considerably enhanced with the Treaty of Nice.
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Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management |
Since June 2000 there has been another new institution belonging to
CFSP — the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. It reflects the changed face of security by dealing with crisis-prevention aspects and drawing up plans to counter crisis using civilian means. It passes on its proposals to the PSC. The Commission is also represented in this committee. In this way a link is established to the EU pillar, which also contains potential for civilian crisis management.
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New military institutions |
We will now finish by taking a look at the two new military institutions: EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS).
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Military Committee |
The Military Committee represents the Council's highest body of experts and is responsible for directing all military activities. It plays an advisory role for the PSC in military affairs and provides the Military Staff with guidelines. The EUMC is made up of chiefs of staff from the member states. A four-star general or admiral is elected by the Council to chair the committee for a period of three years.
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Military Staff |
The Military Staff (EUMS) is responsible for carrying out - similar to the PSC - analysis and planning tasks with regards to meeting the Petersburg tasks. What this means in concrete terms is that it deals with early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. In order to fulfil these tasks effectively, it is linked to the national military staffs and NATO. As a Directorates General, the EUMS is embodied in the Council's Secretariat and employs a staff of around 100. |
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The institutional structure of the second pillar: assessment |
After presenting and analysing this confusing set of institutions in the second pillar and the even more complicated interplay between them, it's time to remind ourselves what all this is actually about. It's all about demonstrating the uniqueness and the special institutional structure of the EU right across the board, which also means taking a look at the second pillar. And its also about understanding clearly just where this uniqueness, which hardly makes things easier, comes from in order to understand better the integration process.
Indeed, as far as this aspect is concerned, it is clear that the
CFSP and ESDP have indeed gone down a very different institutional path compared to pillar one, which over the course of time demonstrates a high level of development towards supranationality. You only have to recall the large number of communitized fields of politics and the active role played by the Commission and the European Parliament in these or judgements handed down by the European Court of Justice that have done so much to promote supranationality.
None of these can be found in the second pillar. While there might have been remarkable development and while the number of tasks might have been increased substantially in the period of time between the EPC and Nice and beyond and while cooperation might have been institutionalized and specialized, there has been no qualitative leap on the scale of Monetary Union in the first pillar for example. Here the emphasis is far more on intergovernmental and supranational elements working together. Having said this, however, intergovernmental elements continue to dominate significantly. Just remember that in most cases voting must be unanimous for decisions to be made.
It is clear that one area is clearly responsible for this situation. And this area is foreign policy as one, if not the classic domain of the sovereign national state in connection with the basic stance of individual states towards the way in which cooperation in the EU should be structured. And this stance is usually deeply rooted in the political culture of individual states. While this might not have been able to prevent huge functional pressure from leaving its mark on the process in the form of the integration of defence policy caused by events such as the developments in the former Yugoslavia including the Kosovo War, it has led to this integration taking on the complicated and awkward institutional shape that I have presented in this section. |
[Author: Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schumann]
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