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Analysis of the Integration Process (II) - Stage 8
Reasons and consequences of the "No" in France and the Netherlands
The reasons for the "No" vote - a first assessment
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The reasons for the "No" vote |
At the end of the last chapter we were left pondering two questions. Firstly, the reasons behind the rejection of the Constitution and, secondly, the consequences. Let us begin with the first of these questions, the reasons behind the no vote. One of the detailed analyses provided so far for the no vote in France offers the following answers.
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The economic situation in the country
Opposition to the government |
According to surveys the economic and social situation in France was the core concern and main reason for voting "No" to the new Constitution for 52 percent of those questioned. 24 percent of those voting No said that they wanted to use the vote as an opportunity to oppose the government and the state President. 31 percent said that they wanted to express their mistrust in the political classes in general. In other words, it was domestic concerns that provoked people into voting No.
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Majority for the Constitution!
EU seen positively |
Indeed, this impression is only reinforced when considering the fact that a majority of EU citizens actually support the basic principle of a European Constitution (61%) and – as demonstrated in the latest Eurobarometer survey carried out in July 2005 - that even in France (53%) and Holland a majority of citizens (67%) said that they regarded membership of the EU as being very positive! In contrast, scepticism towards further enlargement and especially towards the possible membership of Turkey seems to have grown.
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Conflicting picture |
As far as the "No" vote is concerned, then, the picture is very contradictory. It's like a jigsaw that simply will not fit together. The only thing that seems to be clear is that it has become impossible to distinguish between the different levels of the EU (at a domestic and EU level) and that the EU must now put a great deal of energy into making itself much more open to Europe's citizens and into "taking the people" with it as it develops further. In stark contrast to the early days of the EEC and EC, the citizens of the EU, the inhabitants of the member states have become a key influencing factor on the EU. The following illustration sums up the findings we have made so far.
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The consequences of the "No" vote for the integration process - decision rules
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The Treaty of Nice remains the legal basis of the EU |
Now let's address the second question that arises as a consequence of the "No" vote. What are the consequences now that the Constitution will not be ratified or come into force in the foreseeable future? Well, for one, the Treaty of Nice will remain the valid legal basis for action taken within the EU for the time being. To get an idea of what this means in concrete terms, we recommend taking another look at our assessment of the findings from Stage 6. Clicking on the link opens a new window with the following text; when you have finished reading the page, simply close the window to return to this page.
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Qualified majority voting decisions made very difficult indeed |
To shed a little light onto the situation, I would like to draw on an example of an absolutely essential element to demonstrate just how difficult things have been made when it comes to decision making within the EU (as mentioned in the assessment). The element we are talking about is the rules on qualified majority voting. The following illustration highlights the most important aspects.
It is clear, then, from the institutional structure and the decision-making rules that we are dealing with a difficult situation, which makes the ability of the EU to make decisions and act extremely difficult. On the other hand, however, our overview of the EU's history has also shown us that it is possible to reach consensus on overcoming deadlock. Just think back to the internal market project and the Single European Act, which, after almost 20 years of stagnation, were agreed upon and put into force unanimously (!) [Back to top of page]
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The consequences of the "No" vote for the integration process - heterogeneity of the member states
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Supplementary investigation of the lines of conflict between member states necessary |
What made it possible? It was made possible because
two other factors were in play. For one there was a great deal of functional pressure because of the fear that economically the EU could fall far behind the USA and Japan and for another a situation of relative homogeneity was reached vis-a-vis the positions and interests of the member states. These factors make agreement possible even when faced with having to reach a unanimous decision.
What does this mean for our investigation into the situation following the "No" votes in the referendums. Well, as far assessing the consequences of the No vote on the development of the integration process, it means that just having knowledge of the decision-making rules is not enough and that we must turn our attention towards finding out whether and to what degree the interests of the member states are similar.
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5 central lines of conflict |
Given that the EU is now far more heterogeneous and the number of members has increased substantially, things do not bode well. Indeed, when looking more closely at the situation five central lines of conflict can be identified, some of which have only been made significantly worse since enlargement.
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Rich vs. poor |
The first line of conflict is the one between the rich and poor nations. This gap is nothing new and has been one of the key factors since the mid 1980s. Clashes have been taking place between the relatively wealthy member states such as Germany and the structurally weak nations such as Greece, Portugal and Spain, which have been profiting from the EU's Structural and Cohesion Fund.
This issue, however, has become much more serious following enlargement. The average gross national product per capita of all the nations that joined the Union on the 1st of May 2004 taken together is just about half of the average per capita average of the EU 15! Not only that, there is also a great deal of differences when comparing the new member states among each other.
This means, then, that we need to split the 25 EU states into three groups: A leading group to which the majority of the EU 15 belong; a secondary group which includes the poorest EU 15 nations (Greece, Portugal, Spain) and the most wealthy of the new member states (Cyprus, Slovenia, Malta, the Czech Republic and Hungary) and finally a bottom group consisting of the poorest countries including Poland and three Baltic states.
Not only can we expect clashes between group 1 on the one side and groups 2 and 3 on the other, but also with heavy clashes between groups 2 and 3 when it comes to drawing up the mechanisms and criterion for the distribution of financial aid.
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Large vs. small |
The lines of conflict between large and small states is particularly noticeable when it comes to institutional issues. It stems from the continual increase in smaller nations, which have conspired to bring ever more imbalance to a decision-making system that is already over-proportionally weighted in favour of the small states.
On the whole it is fair to say that the small states have attached a great deal of importance to making sure that they have a permanent seat in the Commission and ensuring that the Commission plays a central role in the decision-making process. For their part, the large nations have put a great deal of energy into achieving more weight for the Council's voting procedure and a stronger concentration of executive powers in the European Council.
Here, too, this line of conflict has been made more serious and more complicated by enlargement. After all, with the exception of Poland, the ten new member states fall into the small or very small categories!
The effects of this have already been seen during the discussions on the Constitution. When it came to institutional questions, the new member states in most cases decided to side with the small (EU 15) states. This will do little to improve the ability of the EU to act. On the other hand, however, this should also increase the interest of the larger states to work together more closely, something which is already beginning to be seen.
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Supranational vs. intergovernmental cooperation |
The clashes between the states that would like to see the EU progressing on a supranational level, that is, the states that would like to see a more federal Europe, and the nations that want to preserve their own national sovereignty, that is, those looking to see cooperation take place on an intergovernmental level are as old as the integration process itself. Following the previous enlargements of the EU
such as the one in 1973 (United Kingdom and Denmark) and the one
in 1995 (Sweden), the number of countries favouring the latter
grew. The new round of enlargement in 2004 and the addition of a
further ten members has served in intensifying this situation.
The reason for this is that many of the new member states attach a great deal of importance to their national sovereignty, which, when considering their history, is hardly surprising. The stance of Poland during the discussions and voting on the new Constitution that was finally agreed upon in June 2004 illustrates this clearly. |
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"Europeans" vs. "Atlantics" |
Another line of conflict that is as old as the EC itself is the difference of opinion between "Europeans and Atlantics". This line splits those countries that believe that the EU should create its own US-independent foreign and defence policy and those countries - in particular the UK - that see close cooperation with the USA and its dominant institutions as indispensable.
The extent to which enlargement will impact upon this situation became abundantly clear during the Iraq War. Rather than supporting the anti-war stance of Germany, France and other EU states, most of the Central and East European countries sided with the USA. |
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New vs. old member states |
Another line of division is the one splitting the new member states from the old member states. The effects of this should not be underestimated. It divides those countries that are already familiar with the special institutions, the „ground rules“ and the way in which the EU goes about achieving compromises from those that are still learning and internalizing these procedures. One example of this might be the behaviour of Poland during the first round of voting on the draft Constitution in 2003.
So, if we now take these lines of conflict and put them together with the institutional situation that we touched upon previously, what picture do we get of the current situation? Let's take a look at the following illustration. |
The consequences of the "No" vote for the integration process - decision rules and lines of conflict within the scope of cooperation
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Interplay between decision rules and lines of conflict
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New influencing factor: the stance of the EU citizens |
As you can see the current constellation is now very different and much more difficult than it was during the ten years before the Single European ACT and internal market project. Not only that, our illustration has not taken into account another major factor, namely the influence now being brought to bear by the populations of the member states, which is restricting still further the room for manoeuvre available to the respective governments of the member states.
Looking at the next illustration, then, it is difficult not to be very pessimistic about how the EU will continue to develop as we move forwards. But before we get too downhearted, we should mention that the picture above is not entirely complete and needs to be supplemented. As we have already discovered from looking at the history of the EU, other factors are in play that push member states towards finding joint solutions. Let's take a look at the following illustration. [Back to top of page]
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The consequences of the "No" vote for the integration process - other influencing factors
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Other factors
External factors
Acquis |
These include a large and varied number of external challenges that demand a united response from the EU. Finding the right response to these external factors always proved possible in the past.
Then there are the existing legally binding regulations which has grown to encompass some 80,000 pages of law, the way in which areas are connected and the functional constraints that both result from these regulations, which conspire to push nations towards finding a unanimous solution.
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Supranational bodies |
And then, lastly, we need to look beyond the member states and their representation in the Union's structure, the Council and the Council of the European Union upon which our perspective was narrowed on the previous illustrations. We also have to consider the supranational institutions, which have always found clever ways of using the functional constraints to achieve supranational solutions and to push the development of the EU onwards. Indeed, our brief journey through the EU's development process has shown this to be true and valid.
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Summary |
Nevertheless, it has to be said that the probability of this being possible with all 25 and soon-to-be 27 member states has been significantly reduced for the reasons that we have already touched upon. Reaching flexible solutions would appear to be a more likely scenario. This would involve a situation similar to the Schengen agreement or monetary union to which not all member states are party.
Moreover, in those cases where a unanimous decision is required - such as proposals to enlarge the Union still further - enthusiasm will probably be far more restrained than in the past. While this should not affect the up-coming membership of Bulgaria and Rumania, it probably will affect talks with Turkey and nations in the Balkans.
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[Author: Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schumann]
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