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Expansion of the EFTA and implementation of the provisions made at Maastricht |
In addition to further expansion of its membership on the 1st of January 1995 to include Finland, Austria and Sweden - Norway had held a referendum in November 1994 in which 52 percent of the country's voters had decided against membership - the Union's internal development was mainly characterized by the way in which it dealt with the new instruments created by the Treaty of Maastricht and the implementation of the provisions created by it, as well as by the preparations for the next intergovernmental conference in 1996, for which a two years remained.
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Preparations for the next intergovernmental conference |
In June 1994, only six months after the Treaty of Maastricht had come into force, a reflection group was set up to make preparations for the intergovernmental conference in 1996. The European Council laid down the working program for the conference in March 1996 based on the working group's report.
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The Treaty of Amsterdam |
The process of reform involving a reflection group and intergovernmental conference culminated in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which represented the third largest treaty revision after the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht. The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997 and came into force on the 1st of May 1999. Starting with the EC pillar I would like to address the main changes separately according to the three pillars of the EU.
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Reforms to the EC pillar |
The planned expansion of qualified majority voting into a large number of policy areas could not be achieved. Even to the surprise of the European Parliament, it was decided instead to introduce the co-decision procedure in many policy areas such as employment, transport and development.
As far as the context of our investigations are concerned, one of the most significant aspects was the inability to reach an agreement on the most central and pressing institutional issues, on how the European Commission should be structured and the weighting of votes in the Council. Indeed, this aspect is so significant that it will go on to influence all further development.
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Reforms to the third pillar |
The reforms affecting the third pillar can be seen in the following overview: Those areas immediately affecting the internal market were incorporated into community law. Before we take a look at the second pillar, CFSP, I would like to mention two other important resolutions that do not quite fit into the three pillar system.
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Graduated integration |
Firstly, the decision aimed at allowing individual member states to cooperate more closely, without all members having to participate. According to the Amsterdam compromise, a majority decision is needed to decide as to whether such cooperation is admissible. What we are talking about here, then, is the inauguration of the option on graduated integration, but with relatively high barriers: A
majority of member states have to take part, EU institutions have to involved and the working of the EU may not be put in danger.
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Stability and employment pact |
And, secondly, the stability and employment pact. It was decided to introduce a procedure that begins with an assessment of the situation in member states. The Council of Ministers is responsible for setting annual guidelines, which national governments are supposed to adhere to. Each member state reports to Brussels once a year; the Council then examines these reports and can - using qualified majority voting - issue recommendations to the individual governments.
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Joint foreign and security policy (2nd pillar) |
The picture for the CFSP is very ambivalent indeed. While modifications were made to the decision-making procedure - especially rules aimed at making majority decisions possible and an end to the situation in which abstentions from individual states could prevent decisions from being taken -, each and every member state retained its right of veto.
The capacities for more forward-looking foreign policies were to be improved by establishing a so-called strategic planning and early-warning unit made up of representatives from the Council, the Commission and the WEU, as well as improvements to cooperation with the WEU in general. As for the option of integrating the WEU completely into the EU - something which had been on the table for a long time - no agreement could be reached.
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Assessing the Treaty of Amsterdam |
An assessment of the Treaty of Amsterdam offers a mixed picture. It is recognizable, for instance, that real efforts were made to compensate for the clear deficits that had arisen during the implementation of the resolutions made at Maastricht. Indeed, this is reflected in working program detailed in the report put forward to the European Council by the reflection group. And, to a certain extent, these efforts to compensate for deficiencies were actually successful. Especially worthy of note - despite all the delays and provisos in the Treaty's text - was the progress made on improving cooperation in justice and home affairs.
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Preparations for further enlargement unsuccessful |
Yet it is also glaringly clear that the Treaty of Amsterdam failed in one of its main objectives, namely to prepare the EU for Enlargement. Neither the weighting of votes in the Council which was so central to the enlargement plans nor the composition and working practices of the Commission were modified; indeed, even the desperately needed expansion of qualified majority voting in the Council in the face of ever more members proved to be unachievable. As far a the critics were concerned, the Treaty of Amsterdam failed to deliver the necessary changes and was just another missed opportunity to achieve lasting deepening of the integration process. Indeed, this was viewed by many with a heavy heart as it had been hoped that the huge changes that had taken place in Europe during the late 80s and early 90s would provide a unique historical opportunity to create a united Europe.
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Pace of change quickens |
It is, however, clear that following the adoption of the Single European Act, the EC or rather the EU had found itself in an ever faster and ever intensive process of discussion about its own "ground rules" and about the way in which it should adjust to internal and especially external conditions that had changed. While a relatively short period of time had at least passed between the adoption of the SEA to the beginning of discussions about further treaty changes, which eventually ended with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht, the debate on still further necessary modifications and changes to the treaty, which would lead to the Treaty of Amsterdam, began almost simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty of Maastricht. |
