Stage 7 of our history on the European Union detailed the difficulties encountered leading up to and during the European Council in Nice. We now turn our attention to the results of these extremely fraught discussions. What are the core provisions of the Treaty of Nice and what changes will they bring? As we already know, discussions at the intergovernmental conference were set against ongoing accession negotiations with 12 other nations and were aimed at ensuring that the Union could still function with almost twice as many members by making changes to its institutions. The following five issues were at the centre of negotiations: The size and composition of the Commission; the weighting of votes in the Council; the possibility of expanding the scope of decisions taken using qualified majority voting, other questions arising from the remnants of the Treaty of Amsterdam and, finally, closer cooperation.

As far as the size and composition of the Commission is concerned, the Treaty provides for only one Commissioner to be sent by each nation starting in 2005. The number of commissioners will be capped from the 27th member onwards (the total number of commissioners may not exceed 26). A rotation system will be introduced to ensure that all member states are treated fairly.

As for the closely connected issues of the weighting of votes in the Council and the expansion of the scope of decisions taken using qualified majority voting, the Treaty provides for qualified majority voting to replace unanimous voting for around 30 of its provisions after it has been ratified - core issues will, however, remain outside these changes. The number of votes in the Council will also be reweighed from the 1st of January 2005 (see illustration above). In the future a qualified majority vote will be given

As shown by the illustration, the Treaty of Nice also provides for redistribution of the seats in the European Parliament, which, firstly, at least goes some way to moderating the imbalance of representation with regards to MPs from individual states and, secondly, limits the total number of MPs to 732 set against efforts to ensure that the Parliament can still work.

Let us now turn to the last of the five core issues addressed at Nice, so-called closer cooperation. Results in this area can be summarized thus: While it may be true that the obstacles preventing closer cooperation will be considerably less in the future and this will undoubtedly make it easier to overcome existing barriers in individual areas, it will not be possible to apply these changes as a instrument for deepening and for opening up new policy areas. This is because the constraints to which they are subjected are too rigid across all three pillars.

This completes our summary of the changes ushered in with the Treaty of Nice. How should we categorize and evaluate the changes made in Nice set against the previous development of the EU, which we have already addressed? Here, one has to come to the conclusion that the conditions needed to initiate the enlargement process were only achieved on the surface and at a formal level. Scratch away at this surface, however, and the picture is very different indeed, revealing a situation in which the Treaty of Nice actually puts strain on the future of the Union. One reason for this was disagreement between member states, which surpassed anything seen previously and involved states haggling about "national interests" in a way that had never been witnessed before. While this is bound to have considerable after-effects for the working atmosphere, it is also reflected in decisions taken at Nice which have left the EU burdened with a structural deficit. Just consider if you will the resolutions on the Commission, which are a long way behind the rules adopted at Amsterdam or the way in which decisions taken using qualified majority voting have been made more difficult.

All in all, then, the overall impression of Nice is not of an opportunity taken to improve the EU's ability to make decisions, but rather of the expanding of "the power to block" by individual member states. As far as our guiding question on the determining factors and development model of the integration process is concerned, this represents an important finding.

Just as the last large treaty revision with the Treaty of Maastricht proved to be problematic, so did the ratification of the Treaty of Nice. During an obligatory referendum on the draft from 29th of March 2001, the people of Ireland surprisingly rejected the Treaty on the 7th of June 2001 with 53.87 percent voting against and 46.13 for the Treaty; turnout was only 32.9 percent! Of course, we will not be addressing the varied reasons for this result set against the domestic background in Ireland. It should be noted, however - and this is supported by the alarmingly low election turnout -, that the reasons for this should not be sought primarily in the rejection of the EU by the Irish. How could it be? After all, Ireland has reaped great benefit out of its EU membership especially in financial terms. No, a more plausible explanation might be the clumsy way in which the government dealt with anti-European sentiment. In doing so, it put what should have been a comfortable referendum victory in a loss.

Let us move on to the possible consequences of the no-vote in Ireland. Do the events in Ireland actually mean that around 500,000 people will be allowed to bring about the collapse of the new EU Treaty and, with it, to put in jeopardy the EU's large enlargement project? In theory, of course, this is a possibility, since the Treaty can only come into force after it has been ratified by all member states without exception. But the chances of this scenario actually coming to pass is, for several reasons, very unlikely indeed.

For one, the Irish government is currently putting a great deal of effort into achieving a yes-vote in a second referendum. An example of these efforts is the National Forum on Europe which was set up in October 2001. The Forum is a non-partisan organization, which, with cooperation coming from social partners and civil groups, has been tasked with discussing the implications of the no-vote. According to a speech delivered by Bertie Ahern, the Taoiseach (Irish prime minister), to mark the opening of the Forum on the 18th of October, these discussions will serve in "informing and enlightening the people we serve". The sentiment of the entire speech makes it quite clear that the Irish government will be doing its utmost to secure a yes-vote in a second referendum.

Given that Denmark was faced with similar difficulties in 1992 after a referendum on ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht returned a no-vote and given that it was able to secure a yes-vote in a second referendum after renegotiating certain aspects and securing opt-outs, it would seem that Ireland's chances of achieving something similar are very good. Indeed, as far as EU skepticism among many sections of its population is concerned, Denmark can be regarded as a far more difficult partner than Ireland. And even if subsequent amendments to the text are no longer possible because the Treaty has already been ratified in a large number of states, Ireland's chances of securing a yes-vote still remain good.

We have almost reached the end of our broad survey of the history of the EU. All that remains is the The Laeken European Council from the 14th and 15th of December 2001. Our main attention will be focused on a document adopted in Laeken, since this will allow us to expand the scope of our examination beyond the period already covered and to take a look at the future development of the EU and, in turn, to expand the scope of our final assessment. The document concerned is called "Laeken Declaration - The Future of the European Union". Only 8 pages in length, this paper combines a brief review and assessment of the current situation under the following headings

while attempting to outline the possible solutions to these challenges and taking the first steps towards their realization. In other words, it provides information about the issues that will be right at the top of the EU's agenda in the coming years. And these are:

Another aspect worthy of special attention vis-à-vis our guiding question is the very special method for dealing with these issues chosen by heads of state and government at their meeting and which is also explained in the declaration. Similar to the procedure chosen for work on the Charter of Fundamental Rights under the chairmanship of Roman Herzog, the former President of Germany, a Convention is to be set up which will include "the main parties in the debate about the future of the European Union".

Chaired by the former French president, Giscard d’Estaing, and two vice-presidents, the Convention will be composed of 15 representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States (one from each Member State), 30 members of national parliaments (two from each Member State), 16 members of the European Parliament and two Commission representatives - it convened for the first time on 1st of March 2002. Observers will also attend the meetings; three representatives from the Economic and Social Committee, three representatives from the European social partners, six representatives from the Committee of the Regions and the European Ombudsman. The declaration also goes on to announce that the Convention will open a Forum for all organizations representing civil society (the social partners, the business world, non-governmental organizations, academia, etc). Such organizations may be heard or consulted on specific topics in accordance with arrangements to be established by the Presidium. It should also be highlighted that discussions in the Convention will be made available to the public in the form of official documents in all eleven official languages.

The Council will be kept informed of the progress of the Convention's proceedings. The Convention Chairman will give an oral progress report at each European Council meeting, thus enabling Heads of State or Government to give their views at the same time. The Convention will consider the various issues. It will draw up a final document which may comprise either different options, indicating the degree of support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is achieved. Together with the outcome of national debates on the future of the Union, the final document will provide a starting point for discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference scheduled for 2004, which will make the ultimate decisions.

All this does not sound very unusual or spectacular, especially since member states retain their right of decision as has always been the case. On closer examination, however, this impression proves to have been deceiving. If we look back at what we already learned during the second and third basic courses, it might well be supposed that a structure such as the Convention will develop from its own momentum. It offers parties interested in seeing more deepening in the EU a host of possibilities for reaching their objective. In addition to this, there can be little doubt that the decision to extend discussions on issues of central importance to Europe's citizens to encompass groups outside the corridors of power is to be more than welcomed from a normative point of view.

[Author: Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schumann, Editor: Ragnar Müller]

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